Duncan Pritchard


  • 2305 Citations
  • 25 h-Index
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Personal profile


Duncan Pritchard FRSE is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh, a post he has held since 2007. Prior to taking up this position, he was Professor of Philosophy at the University of Stirling. He works mainly in epistemology, and has published widely in this area. In 2007 he was awarded the Philip Leverhulme Prize. In 2011 he was elected to a Fellowship of the Royal Society of Edinburgh. In 2013 he will deliver the annual Soochow Lectures in Philosophy in Taipei.

Research interests

Duncan's research is mainly in epistemology with particular focus on the following issues: the problem of scepticism, the epistemic externalism/internalism distinction; the rationality of religious belief; testimony; the relationship between epistemic and content externalism; virtue epistemology; epistemic value; modal epistemology; the history of scepticism; and epistemological contextualism.

Fingerprint Fingerprint is based on mining the text of the person's scientific documents to create an index of weighted terms, which defines the key subjects of each individual researcher.

Epistemology Arts & Humanities
Skepticism Arts & Humanities
Epistemic Luck Arts & Humanities
Epistemological Arts & Humanities
Virtue Epistemology Arts & Humanities
Radical Scepticism Arts & Humanities
Luck Arts & Humanities
Epistemic Values Arts & Humanities

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Research Output 2000 2018

Anti-luck virtue epistemology and epistemic defeat

Pritchard, D. Jul 2018 In : Synthese. 195, 7, p. 3065–3077 13 p.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

cognitive ability

Epistemic angst

Pritchard, D. Jan 2018 In : Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 96, 1, p. 70-90 21 p.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

External World

Extended virtue epistemology

Pritchard, D. 2018 In : Inquiry (United Kingdom). 61, 5-6, p. 632-647 16 p.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Open Access

Propositional epistemic luck, epistemic risk, and epistemic justification

Bondy, P. & Pritchard, D. Sep 2018 In : Synthese. 195, 9, p. 3811-3820 10 p.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Open Access
Epistemic Justification
Epistemic Luck

Cognitive bias, scepticism and understanding

Adam Carter, J. & Pritchard, D. 2017 Explaining understanding: new perspectives from epistemology and philosophy of science. Grimm, S. R., Baumberger, C. & Ammon, S. (eds.). New York ; London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, p. 272-292 21 p.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter