A cut-off phenomenon in location based random access games with imperfect information

Hazer Inaltekin, Mung Chiang, H. Vincent Poor

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference proceeding contribution

Abstract

This paper analyzes the behavior of selfish transmitters under imperfect location information. The scenario considered is that of a wireless network consisting of selfish nodes that are randomly distributed over the network domain according to a known probability distribution, and that are interested in communicating with a common sink node using common radio resources. In this scenario, the wireless nodes do not know the exact locations of their competitors but rather have belief distributions about these locations. Firstly, properties of the packet success probability curve as a function of the node-sink separation are obtained for such networks. Secondly, a monotonicity property for the best-response strategies of selfish nodes is identified. That is, for any given strategies of competitors of a node, there exists a critical node-sink separation for this node such that its best-response is to transmit when its distance to the sink node is smaller than this critical threshold, and to back off otherwise. Finally, necessary and sufficient conditions for a given strategy profile to be a Nash equilibrium are provided.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication4th International ICST Conference on Wireless Internet
EditorsXudong Wang, Ness B. Shroff
PublisherInstitute for Color Science and Technology (ICST)
Number of pages7
ISBN (Electronic)9789639799363
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 16 May 2010
Externally publishedYes
Event4th Annual International Conference on Wireless Internet, WICON 2008 - Maui, United States
Duration: 17 Nov 200819 Nov 2008

Conference

Conference4th Annual International Conference on Wireless Internet, WICON 2008
CountryUnited States
CityMaui
Period17/11/0819/11/08

Keywords

  • Random access
  • imperfect information
  • selfish transmitters
  • Nash equilibrium

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