A duopoly pricing game for wireless IP services

Hazer Inaltekin, Tom Wexler, Stephen B. Wicker

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference proceeding contributionpeer-review

15 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper addresses the behavior of the selfish service providers in the form of IP sinks providing high-speed IP access. Service providers compete for mobile users by adjusting the price they charge for their services. Their aim is to maximize the total collected profit. Mobile users are also selfish choosing the service provider offering the best quality of service and price combination. As the service providers come closer to each other, we show the existence of three critical phase transitions in their behavior. Depending on the separation between them, there may exists a unique Nash equilibrium, or a continuum of Nash equilibria, or no Nash equilibrium. We completely characterize the pricing strategies of service providers at Nash equilibria. We also prove that the total social welfare in the presence of selfish providers is close to the maximum social welfare that can reached through non-selfish optimization.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication2007 4th Annual IEEE Communications Society Conference on Sensor, Mesh and Ad Hoc Communications and Networks
Place of PublicationPiscataway, NJ
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
Pages600-609
Number of pages10
ISBN (Electronic)1424412684
ISBN (Print)978142441286
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2007
Externally publishedYes
Event2007 4th Annual IEEE Communications Society Conference on Sensor, Mesh and Ad Hoc Communications and Networks, SECON - San Diego, CA, United States
Duration: 18 Jun 200721 Jun 2007

Publication series

Name
ISSN (Print)2155-5486
ISSN (Electronic)2155-5494

Conference

Conference2007 4th Annual IEEE Communications Society Conference on Sensor, Mesh and Ad Hoc Communications and Networks, SECON
CountryUnited States
CitySan Diego, CA
Period18/06/0721/06/07

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