A formal defense pact in the Indo-Pacific is the wrong answer

The debate over how best to deter China in the western Pacific has reached a new level of ambition. Ely Ratner, a former senior defense official in the Biden administration, proposed a “Pacific Defense Pact” — a legally binding multilateral treaty among the United States, Japan, Australia, and the Philippines. This reflects serious concerns over China’s rise and its potential future use of force along the first island chain. The underlying diagnosis is sound: Existing U.S. alliances in the region lack an integrated command and control structure and the collective responsiveness required to credibly deter China in a high-intensity conflict. But the proposed remedy deserves careful scrutiny. A formal pact, however well-intentioned, carries risks that its advocates have not fully reckoned with: theoretical risks rooted in the logic of deterrence, and practical risks embedded in the realities of alliance politics.