A game-theoretic model for mergers and acquisitions

Robin C. van den Honert*, Theodor J. Stewart

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The corporate merger process is modelled as a bargaining game under certainty. The distribution of gains between target and acquiring companies that would be consistent with the Nash-Kalai axioms is determined in principle. An operational version of the resulting game-theoretic model is fitted to empirical results from 24 recent mergers of companies quoted on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. The model is shown to have good predictive power within this set of data.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)275-287
Number of pages13
JournalEuropean Journal of Operational Research
Volume59
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 10 Jun 1992
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • bargaining solution
  • Mergers and acquisitions
  • Nash-Kalai axioms
  • utility gains

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