A game-theoretic model for mergers and acquisitions

Robin C. van den Honert; Theodor J. Stewart

doi:10.1016/0377-2217(92)90141-U

A game-theoretic model for mergers and acquisitions

Robin C. van den Honert^*, Theodor J. Stewart

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The corporate merger process is modelled as a bargaining game under certainty. The distribution of gains between target and acquiring companies that would be consistent with the Nash-Kalai axioms is determined in principle. An operational version of the resulting game-theoretic model is fitted to empirical results from 24 recent mergers of companies quoted on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. The model is shown to have good predictive power within this set of data.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	275-287
Number of pages	13
Journal	European Journal of Operational Research
Volume	59
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/0377-2217(92)90141-U
Publication status	Published - 10 Jun 1992
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

bargaining solution
Mergers and acquisitions
Nash-Kalai axioms
utility gains

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10.1016/0377-2217(92)90141-U

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KW - utility gains

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A game-theoretic model for mergers and acquisitions

Abstract

Keywords

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