I offer a new metacognitive account of the feeling of agency over bodily actions. According to this model, the feeling of agency is the metacognitive monitoring of 2 cues: (1) smoothness of action, done via monitoring the output of the comparison between actual and predicted sensory consequences of action; and (2) action outcome, done via monitoring the outcome of action and its success relative to a prior intention. Previous research has shown that the comparator model offers a powerful explanation of the feeling of agency. However, within the literature, there is a growing sense of dissatisfaction with the model; a consensus seems to be building that the model is not up to the task of explaining all of the new discoveries since its inception regarding the feeling of agency. Most problematically, current paradigms seriously challenge the comparator model by suggesting that a weak feeling of agency can be elicited even when no motor prediction is formed. The new account offered here inherits the explanatory power of the comparator model while avoiding this problem.
|Number of pages||12|
|Journal||Psychology of consciousness : theory, research, and practice|
|Publication status||Published - 2015|
- sense of agency
- feeling of agency