A new defence of doxasticism about delusions

the cognitive phenomenological defence

Peter Clutton*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

Clinicians and cognitive scientists typically conceive of delusions as doxastic—they view delusions as beliefs. But some philosophers have countered with anti-doxastic objections: delusions cannot be beliefs because they fail the necessary conditions of belief. A common response involves meeting these objections on their own terms by accepting necessary conditions on belief but trying to blunt their force. I take a different approach by invoking a cognitive-phenomenal view of belief and jettisoning the rational/behavioural conditions. On this view, the anti-doxastic claims can be rejected outright, and doxasticism can be defended. I call this the cognitive phenomenological defence of doxasticism.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)198-217
Number of pages20
JournalMind and Language
Volume33
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Apr 2018

Keywords

  • belief
  • cognitive phenomenology
  • delusion
  • doxasticism
  • mechanistic explanation
  • realism

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