A non-malleable group key exchange protocol robust against active insiders

Yvo Desmedt*, Josef Pieprzyk, Ron Steinfeld, Huaxiong Wang

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference proceeding contributionpeer-review

16 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper we make progress towards solving an open problem posed by Katz and Yung at CRYPTO 2003. We propose the first protocol for key exchange among n ≥ 2k + 1 parties which simultaneously achieves all of the following properties: 1. Key Privacy (including forward security) against active attacks by group outsiders, 2. Non-malleability - meaning in particular that no subset of up to k corrupted group insiders can 'fix' the agreed key to a desired value, and 3. Robustness against denial of service attacks by up to k corrupted group insiders. Our insider security properties above are achieved assuming the availability of a reliable broadcast channel.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationInformation Security - 9th International Conference, ISC 2006, Proceedings
EditorsSokratis K. Katsikas, Javier Lopez, Michael Backes, Stefanos Gritzalis, Bart Preneel
Place of PublicationBerlin; New York
PublisherSpringer, Springer Nature
Pages459-475
Number of pages17
Volume4176 LNCS
ISBN (Print)3540383417, 9783540383413
Publication statusPublished - 2006
Event9th International Information Security Conference, ISC 2006 - Samos Island, Greece
Duration: 30 Aug 20062 Sep 2006

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume4176 LNCS
ISSN (Print)03029743
ISSN (Electronic)16113349

Other

Other9th International Information Security Conference, ISC 2006
CountryGreece
CitySamos Island
Period30/08/062/09/06

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