A novel analysis of utility in privacy pipelines, using Kronecker products and quantitative information flow

Mário S. Alvim; Natasha Fernandes; Annabelle McIver; Carroll Morgan; Gabriel H. Nunes

doi:10.1145/3576915.3623081

A novel analysis of utility in privacy pipelines, using Kronecker products and quantitative information flow

Mário S. Alvim, Natasha Fernandes, Annabelle McIver, Carroll Morgan, Gabriel H. Nunes

School of Computing

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference proceeding contribution › peer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We combine Kronecker products, and quantitative information flow, to give a novel formal analysis for the fine-grained verification of utility in complex privacy pipelines. The combination explains a surprising anomaly in the behaviour of utility of privacy-preserving pipelines - that sometimes a reduction in privacy results also in a decrease in utility. We use the standard measure of utility for Bayesian analysis, introduced by Ghosh at al. [1], to produce tractable and rigorous proofs of the fine-grained statistical behaviour leading to the anomaly. More generally, we offer the prospect of formal-analysis tools for utility that complement extant formal analyses of privacy. We demonstrate our results on a number of common privacy-preserving designs.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	CCS '23
Subtitle of host publication	proceedings of the 2023 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
Place of Publication	New York
Publisher	Association for Computing Machinery
Pages	1718-1731
Number of pages	14
ISBN (Electronic)	9798400700507
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1145/3576915.3623081
Publication status	Published - 2023
Event	30th ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security - Copenhagen, Denmark Duration: 26 Nov 2023 → 30 Nov 2023 Conference number: 30th

Conference

Conference	30th ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
Abbreviated title	ACM CCS 2023
Country/Territory	Denmark
City	Copenhagen
Period	26/11/23 → 30/11/23

Keywords

Formal verification for utility
privacy-utility trade-off

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10.1145/3576915.3623081

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Alvim, M. S., Fernandes, N., McIver, A., Morgan, C., & Nunes, G. H. (2023). A novel analysis of utility in privacy pipelines, using Kronecker products and quantitative information flow. In CCS '23: proceedings of the 2023 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (pp. 1718-1731). Association for Computing Machinery. https://doi.org/10.1145/3576915.3623081

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title = "A novel analysis of utility in privacy pipelines, using Kronecker products and quantitative information flow",

abstract = "We combine Kronecker products, and quantitative information flow, to give a novel formal analysis for the fine-grained verification of utility in complex privacy pipelines. The combination explains a surprising anomaly in the behaviour of utility of privacy-preserving pipelines - that sometimes a reduction in privacy results also in a decrease in utility. We use the standard measure of utility for Bayesian analysis, introduced by Ghosh at al. [1], to produce tractable and rigorous proofs of the fine-grained statistical behaviour leading to the anomaly. More generally, we offer the prospect of formal-analysis tools for utility that complement extant formal analyses of privacy. We demonstrate our results on a number of common privacy-preserving designs.",

keywords = "Formal verification for utility, privacy-utility trade-off",

author = "Alvim, {M{\'a}rio S.} and Natasha Fernandes and Annabelle McIver and Carroll Morgan and Nunes, {Gabriel H.}",

year = "2023",

doi = "10.1145/3576915.3623081",

language = "English",

pages = "1718--1731",

booktitle = "CCS '23",

publisher = "Association for Computing Machinery",

note = "30th ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, ACM CCS 2023 ; Conference date: 26-11-2023 Through 30-11-2023",

}

Alvim, MS, Fernandes, N , McIver, A, Morgan, C & Nunes, GH 2023, A novel analysis of utility in privacy pipelines, using Kronecker products and quantitative information flow. in CCS '23: proceedings of the 2023 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. Association for Computing Machinery, New York, pp. 1718-1731, 30th ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Copenhagen, Denmark, 26/11/23. https://doi.org/10.1145/3576915.3623081

A novel analysis of utility in privacy pipelines, using Kronecker products and quantitative information flow. / Alvim, Mário S.; Fernandes, Natasha ; McIver, Annabelle et al.
CCS '23: proceedings of the 2023 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. New York: Association for Computing Machinery, 2023. p. 1718-1731.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference proceeding contribution › peer-review

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T1 - A novel analysis of utility in privacy pipelines, using Kronecker products and quantitative information flow

AU - Alvim, Mário S.

AU - Fernandes, Natasha

AU - McIver, Annabelle

AU - Morgan, Carroll

AU - Nunes, Gabriel H.

N1 - Conference code: 30th

PY - 2023

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N2 - We combine Kronecker products, and quantitative information flow, to give a novel formal analysis for the fine-grained verification of utility in complex privacy pipelines. The combination explains a surprising anomaly in the behaviour of utility of privacy-preserving pipelines - that sometimes a reduction in privacy results also in a decrease in utility. We use the standard measure of utility for Bayesian analysis, introduced by Ghosh at al. [1], to produce tractable and rigorous proofs of the fine-grained statistical behaviour leading to the anomaly. More generally, we offer the prospect of formal-analysis tools for utility that complement extant formal analyses of privacy. We demonstrate our results on a number of common privacy-preserving designs.

AB - We combine Kronecker products, and quantitative information flow, to give a novel formal analysis for the fine-grained verification of utility in complex privacy pipelines. The combination explains a surprising anomaly in the behaviour of utility of privacy-preserving pipelines - that sometimes a reduction in privacy results also in a decrease in utility. We use the standard measure of utility for Bayesian analysis, introduced by Ghosh at al. [1], to produce tractable and rigorous proofs of the fine-grained statistical behaviour leading to the anomaly. More generally, we offer the prospect of formal-analysis tools for utility that complement extant formal analyses of privacy. We demonstrate our results on a number of common privacy-preserving designs.

KW - Formal verification for utility

KW - privacy-utility trade-off

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M3 - Conference proceeding contribution

SP - 1718

EP - 1731

BT - CCS '23

PB - Association for Computing Machinery

CY - New York

T2 - 30th ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security

Y2 - 26 November 2023 through 30 November 2023

ER -

A novel analysis of utility in privacy pipelines, using Kronecker products and quantitative information flow

Abstract

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Keywords

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