A reanalysis of the personal/impersonal distinction in moral psychology research

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Abstract

Greene and colleagues [Greene, J., Sommerville, B. R., Nystrom, L. E., Darley, J. M., & Cohen, J. D. (2001). An fMRI investigation of emotional engagement in moral judgment. Science, 293, 2105-2108.] have revealed an apparent distinction in folk psychology between 'up close and personal' and 'impersonal' moral dilemmas. Reasoning about these types of dilemmas is purportedly supported by partially dissociable neural systems. However, further investigation of the data supporting this hypothesis indicated that only a small number of stimuli used by Greene et al. are driving the effect originally found. Implications of the apparent distinction initially reported and of other research in the domain of moral psychology are discussed.

LanguageEnglish
Pages577-580
Number of pages4
JournalJournal of Experimental Social Psychology
Volume45
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - May 2009

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psychology
Psychology
moral judgement
Research
stimulus
Magnetic Resonance Imaging
science

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title = "A reanalysis of the personal/impersonal distinction in moral psychology research",
abstract = "Greene and colleagues [Greene, J., Sommerville, B. R., Nystrom, L. E., Darley, J. M., & Cohen, J. D. (2001). An fMRI investigation of emotional engagement in moral judgment. Science, 293, 2105-2108.] have revealed an apparent distinction in folk psychology between 'up close and personal' and 'impersonal' moral dilemmas. Reasoning about these types of dilemmas is purportedly supported by partially dissociable neural systems. However, further investigation of the data supporting this hypothesis indicated that only a small number of stimuli used by Greene et al. are driving the effect originally found. Implications of the apparent distinction initially reported and of other research in the domain of moral psychology are discussed.",
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A reanalysis of the personal/impersonal distinction in moral psychology research. / McGuire, Jonathan; Langdon, Robyn; Coltheart, Max; Mackenzie, Catriona.

In: Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 45, No. 3, 05.2009, p. 577-580.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

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