Acceptance without minimality

Abhaya C. Nayak*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference proceeding contributionpeer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)


In the belief change literature, while the degree of belief (or disbelief) plays a crucial role, it is assumed that potential hypotheses that have neither been accepted nor rejected cannot be compared with each other in any meaningful manner. We start with the assumption that such hypotheses can be non-trivially compared with respect to their plausibility and argue that a comprehensive theory of acceptance should take into account the degree of beliefs (or disbeliefs) as well as the plausibility of such tenable hypotheses. After showing that such a comprehensive theory of acceptance based on the received principle of minimal change does not lend itself to iterated acceptance, we propose, examine and provide representation results for an alternative theory based on the principle of rejecting the worst that can handle repeated acceptance of evidence.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationLogics in Artificial Intelligence
Subtitle of host publicationEuropean Workshop, JELIA 2000 Malaga, Spain, September 29-October 2, 2000 Proceedings
EditorsManuel Ojeda-Aciego, Imma P. de Guzman, Gerhard Brewka, Luis Moniz Pereira
Place of PublicationBerlin
PublisherSpringer, Springer Nature
Number of pages16
ISBN (Print)3540411313, 9783540411314
Publication statusPublished - 2000
EventEuropean Workshop on Logics in Artificial Intelligence, JELIA 2000 - Malaga, Spain
Duration: 29 Sep 20002 Oct 2000


OtherEuropean Workshop on Logics in Artificial Intelligence, JELIA 2000


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