TY - JOUR
T1 - Addiction is not a brain disease (and it matters)
AU - Levy, Neil
N1 - Copyright the Author(s) 2013. Version archived for private and non-commercial use with the permission of the author/s and according to publisher conditions. For further rights please contact the publisher.
PY - 2013
Y1 - 2013
N2 - The claim that addiction is a brain disease is almost universally accepted among scientists who work on addiction.The claim's attraction rests on two grounds: the fact that addiction seems to be characterized by dysfunction in specific neural pathways and the fact that the claim seems to the compassionate response to people who are suffering. I argue that neural dysfunction is not sufficient for disease: something is a brain disease only when neural dysfunction is sufficient for impairment. I claim that the neural dysfunction that is characteristic of addiction is not sufficient for impairment, because people who suffer from that dysfunction are impaired, sufficiently to count as diseased, only given certain features of their context. Hence addiction is not a brain disease (though it is often a disease, and it may always involve brain dysfunction). I argue that accepting that addiction is not a brain disease does not entail a moralizing attitude toward people who suffer as a result of addiction; if anything, it allows for a more compassionate, and more effective, response to addiction.
AB - The claim that addiction is a brain disease is almost universally accepted among scientists who work on addiction.The claim's attraction rests on two grounds: the fact that addiction seems to be characterized by dysfunction in specific neural pathways and the fact that the claim seems to the compassionate response to people who are suffering. I argue that neural dysfunction is not sufficient for disease: something is a brain disease only when neural dysfunction is sufficient for impairment. I claim that the neural dysfunction that is characteristic of addiction is not sufficient for impairment, because people who suffer from that dysfunction are impaired, sufficiently to count as diseased, only given certain features of their context. Hence addiction is not a brain disease (though it is often a disease, and it may always involve brain dysfunction). I argue that accepting that addiction is not a brain disease does not entail a moralizing attitude toward people who suffer as a result of addiction; if anything, it allows for a more compassionate, and more effective, response to addiction.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84877702702&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.3389/fpsyt.2013.00024
DO - 10.3389/fpsyt.2013.00024
M3 - Article
C2 - 23596425
AN - SCOPUS:84877702702
SN - 1664-0640
VL - 4
SP - 1
EP - 7
JO - Frontiers in Psychiatry
JF - Frontiers in Psychiatry
M1 - 24
ER -