Addiction: the belief oscillation hypothesis

Neil Levy*

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

    10 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    In popular, philosophical and many scientific accounts of addiction, strong desires and other affective states carry a great deal of the explanatory burden. Most of the drug procuring and consuming behaviour of addicts is entirely normal, in the following sense: it gives every appearance of being what psychologists call controlled behaviour, or of being explicable by what philosophers call belief/desire or folk psychology. Central to the addiction phenotype, however, is the response of the midbrain dopamine system to drugs of addiction. Addicted people remain rational agents. They are not simply at the mercy of subpersonal mechanisms that cause representational states to change without apparent reason. Most people – laypeople and specialists alike – regard addiction as causing or constituting pathology of control over behaviour. The chapter suggests that the failure of the midbrain dopamine system to adapt to the reward value of addictive drugs provides a mechanism for such dramatic judgment-shifts.
    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publicationThe Routledge handbook of philosophy and science of addiction
    EditorsHanna Pickard, Serge H. Ahmed
    Place of PublicationLondon ; New York
    PublisherRoutledge, Taylor and Francis Group
    Chapter5
    Pages54-62
    Number of pages9
    ISBN (Electronic)9781317423416, 9781315689197
    ISBN (Print)9781138909281
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2019

    Publication series

    NameRoutledge Handbooks in Philosophy
    PublisherRoutledge

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