Anti-luck epistemology and pragmatic encroachment

Duncan Pritchard*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

A distinctive approach to the theory of knowledge is described, known as anti-luck epistemology. The goal of the paper is to consider whether there are specific features of this proposal that entails that it is committed to pragmatic encroachment, such that whether one counts as having knowledge significantly depends on non-epistemic factors. In particular, the plausibility of the following idea is explored: that since pragmatic factors play an essential role when it comes to the notion of luck, then according to anti-luck epistemology they must likewise play an essential role in our understanding of knowledge as well. It is argued that once anti-luck epistemology is properly understood—where this means, in turn, having the right account of luck in play—then this putative entailment to pragmatic encroachment does not go through.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)715-729
Number of pages15
JournalSynthese
Volume199
Issue number1-2
Early online date26 May 2020
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Dec 2021
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Anti-luck epistemology
  • Epistemology
  • Knowledge
  • Luck
  • Pragmatic encroachment

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