Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology

Duncan Pritchard*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

9 Citations (Scopus)


This chapter canvasses two master intuitions about knowledge: the ability intuition and the anti-luck intuition. It argues that a robust anti-luck epistemology, which takes the antiluck intuition as central, cannot accommodate the ability intuition, and that a robust virtue epistemology which takes the ability intuition as central cannot accommodate the anti-luck intuition. It is suggested that the proper moral to be extracted from this impasse is that we need an anti-luck virtue epistemology - a theory of knowledge which incorporates two separate epistemic conditions designed to accommodate each of the two master intuitions about knowledge. Such a view can accommodate a range of key examples of interest to epistemologists. A genealogical diagnosis of the structure of knowledge is offered which supports this proposal. Anti-luck virtue epistemology can adequately respond to those versions of the value problem for knowledge which do not trade on the intuition that knowledge is finally valuable.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationThe Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations
EditorsDuncan Pritchard, Alan Millar, Adrian Haddock
Place of PublicationOxford
PublisherOxford University Press
Number of pages24
ISBN (Electronic)9780191723360
ISBN (Print)9780199586264
Publication statusPublished - 1 Sep 2010
Externally publishedYes


  • Anti-luck epistemology
  • Anti-luck virtue epistemology
  • Cognitive ability
  • Epistemic luck
  • Epistemic value
  • Knowledge
  • Virtue epistemology


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