Anti-luck virtue epistemology and epistemic defeat

Duncan Pritchard*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

3 Citations (Scopus)


This paper explores how a certain theory of knowledge—known as anti-luck virtue epistemology—can account for, and in the process shed light on, the notion of an epistemic defeater. To this end, an overview of the motivations for anti-luck virtue epistemology is offered, along with a taxonomy of different kinds of epistemic defeater. It is then shown how anti-luck virtue epistemology can explain: (i) why certain kinds of putative epistemic defeater are not bona fide; (ii) how certain kinds of epistemic defeater are genuine in virtue of exposing the subject to significant levels of epistemic risk; and (iii) how certain kinds of epistemic defeater are genuine in virtue of highlighting how the subject’s safe cognitive success does not stand in the appropriate explanatory relationship to her manifestation of relevant cognitive ability.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)3065–3077
Number of pages13
Issue number7
Early online date31 Mar 2016
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2018
Externally publishedYes


  • Anti-luck virtue epistemology
  • Epistemic defeaters
  • Epistemology
  • Knowledge

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Anti-luck virtue epistemology and epistemic defeat'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

  • Cite this