Anti-luck virtue epistemology and epistemic defeat

Duncan Pritchard

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

Abstract

This paper explores how a certain theory of knowledge—known as anti-luck virtue epistemology—can account for, and in the process shed light on, the notion of an epistemic defeater. To this end, an overview of the motivations for anti-luck virtue epistemology is offered, along with a taxonomy of different kinds of epistemic defeater. It is then shown how anti-luck virtue epistemology can explain: (i) why certain kinds of putative epistemic defeater are not bona fide; (ii) how certain kinds of epistemic defeater are genuine in virtue of exposing the subject to significant levels of epistemic risk; and (iii) how certain kinds of epistemic defeater are genuine in virtue of highlighting how the subject’s safe cognitive success does not stand in the appropriate explanatory relationship to her manifestation of relevant cognitive ability.

LanguageEnglish
Pages3065–3077
Number of pages13
JournalSynthese
Volume195
Issue number7
Early online date31 Mar 2016
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2018
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

epistemology
cognitive ability
taxonomy
Luck
Defeat
Virtue Epistemology
Defeaters

Keywords

  • Anti-luck virtue epistemology
  • Epistemic defeaters
  • Epistemology
  • Knowledge

Cite this

Pritchard, Duncan. / Anti-luck virtue epistemology and epistemic defeat. In: Synthese. 2018 ; Vol. 195, No. 7. pp. 3065–3077.
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Anti-luck virtue epistemology and epistemic defeat. / Pritchard, Duncan.

In: Synthese, Vol. 195, No. 7, 07.2018, p. 3065–3077.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

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