Abstract
This article argues for the conclusion that anti-representationalism in the cognitive sciences is not a well-founded theory of cognition. This conclusion is supported by the observation that the link between the sceptical demonstrations and the anti-representational conclusion is too weak for the demonstrations to justify anti-representationalism in general. Rather than denying the need for internal representation, this article aim to establish that representational explanation - reconstructed within a dynamical agent-environment characterization - serves a necessary epistemic and ontological aim: It enables us to demarcate activities that
presuppose intentionality and behavioral autonomy from activities that are merely reactive and situation-determined.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 1-34 |
| Number of pages | 34 |
| Journal | Res Cogitans : journal of philosophy |
| Volume | 2 |
| Issue number | 8 |
| Publication status | Published - 2011 |
| Externally published | Yes |