Anti-risk virtue epistemology

Duncan Pritchard*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

Abstract

Support is canvassed for a new way of approaching some core epistemic issues: anti-risk epistemology. It is explained how anti-risk epistemology differs from anti-luck epistemology by examining some of the subtle (but epistemologically significant) differences between the notions of luck and risk. It is argued that anti-risk epistemology, while essentially an adaption of anti-luck epistemology, can nonetheless resolve some motivational issues that face the latter proposal. In the process, it can provide other important benefits, such as enabling a broader range of epistemic assessments, including capturing the complexity of some important epistemic assessments involving collaborative inquiry. Our ultimate concern, however, is to examine how anti-risk epistemology fits into a wider virtue-theoretic account of knowledge, one that replaces anti-luck virtue epistemology with anti-risk virtue epistemology. As we will see, the latter proposal inherits all the strengths of the former but none of its flaws. It is also better placed to explain why knowledge is never compatible with unsafe belief, and to provide us with a diagnostic handle on the path taken by post-Gettier epistemology.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationVirtue-theoretic epistemology
Subtitle of host publicationnew methods and approaches
EditorsChristoph Kelp, John Greco
PublisherCambridge University Press
Chapter9
Pages203-224
Number of pages22
ISBN (Electronic)9781108666404
ISBN (Print)9781108740463
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2020
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • counterfactual thinking
  • luck epistemology
  • account

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