Arrogance and servility online: humility is not the solution

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

Abstract

It is tempting to think that the epistemic ills that beset the online environment can be mitigated if people are appropriately humble in the way they share and process claims. This chapter argues that epistemic humility is not the best response to the epistemic problems of social media. People routinely display behaviour that may appropriately be described as epistemically arrogant and they also display behaviour that seems epistemically servile. But these behaviours and the dispositions they manifest are not vicious. Instead, they are often dispositions that are knowledge conducive. We would lose these epistemic benefits were to eliminate this arrogance and servility. To improve the epistemic character of the online environment, we should look elsewhere: not to the virtues and vices that we display, but to the structure of that environment.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationThe Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Humility
EditorsMark Alfano, Michael P. Lynch, Allesandra Tanesini
Place of PublicationAbingdon
PublisherRoutledge, Taylor and Francis Group
Chapter40
Pages472-483
Number of pages12
ISBN (Electronic)9781351107532
ISBN (Print)9780815364115
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2021
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Arrogance and servility online: humility is not the solution'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this