Abstract
It is tempting to think that the epistemic ills that beset the online environment can be mitigated if people are appropriately humble in the way they share and process claims. This chapter argues that epistemic humility is not the best response to the epistemic problems of social media. People routinely display behaviour that may appropriately be described as epistemically arrogant and they also display behaviour that seems epistemically servile. But these behaviours and the dispositions they manifest are not vicious. Instead, they are often dispositions that are knowledge conducive. We would lose these epistemic benefits were to eliminate this arrogance and servility. To improve the epistemic character of the online environment, we should look elsewhere: not to the virtues and vices that we display, but to the structure of that environment.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Humility |
Editors | Mark Alfano, Michael P. Lynch, Allesandra Tanesini |
Place of Publication | Abingdon |
Publisher | Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group |
Chapter | 40 |
Pages | 472-483 |
Number of pages | 12 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9781351107532 |
ISBN (Print) | 9780815364115 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2021 |
Externally published | Yes |