Attainment of equilibrium via Marshallian path adjustment: Queueing and buyer determinism

Sean M. Collins*, Duncan James, Maroš Servátka, Radovan Vadovič

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


We examine equilibration in a market where Marshallian path adjustment can be enforced, or not, as a treatment: a posted offer market either with buyer queueing via value order, or random order, respectively. We derive equilibrium predictions, and run experiments crossing queueing rules with either human or deterministically optimizing robot buyers under both locally stationary and non-stationary marginal cost. Results on rate of convergence to competitive equilibrium are obtained, and Marshallian path adjustment is established as conducive to attaining competitive equilibrium.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)94-106
Number of pages13
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2021


  • Advance production
  • Equilibration
  • Market entry game
  • Marshallian path adjustment
  • Posted offer


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