TY - CHAP
T1 - Australia and Chinese nuclear modernization
T2 - waking up to new nuclear realities
AU - Lee, Lavina
PY - 2024/5
Y1 - 2024/5
N2 - Australia assumes that it is covered by U.S. extended nuclear deterrence, but this has never been acknowledged in joint statements by the two countries. As such, there is a lack of clarity about either country’s understanding of the scope of U.S. nuclear guarantees toward Australian territory or military assets, or what role Australia may be asked to play in supporting U.S. nuclear deterrence in peacetime or in conflict. China has made significant progress in modernizing, diversifying, and expanding its nuclear forces, thereby improving their survivability. While Canberra has plans in place to acquire or develop its long-range strike and missile defense capabilities, it is currently dependent on U.S. extended deterrence against potential Chinese threats. Canberra should also be concerned that China may be moving away from its no-first-use nuclear policy and may contemplate the use of tactical nuclear weapons to coerce the U.S. and its allies and deter them from intervening in a regional conflict. It is likely that Australia will be involved militarily in a Taiwan contingency if the U.S. chooses to intervene, but its contributions would vary according to whether conflict remains localized or widened. Either way, Australian territory would be used to support U.S. forces operating farther afield, putting Australian bases under threat from Chinese long-range missiles. Awkward questions on both sides of the alliance about the scope and reliability of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence can no longer be avoided.
AB - Australia assumes that it is covered by U.S. extended nuclear deterrence, but this has never been acknowledged in joint statements by the two countries. As such, there is a lack of clarity about either country’s understanding of the scope of U.S. nuclear guarantees toward Australian territory or military assets, or what role Australia may be asked to play in supporting U.S. nuclear deterrence in peacetime or in conflict. China has made significant progress in modernizing, diversifying, and expanding its nuclear forces, thereby improving their survivability. While Canberra has plans in place to acquire or develop its long-range strike and missile defense capabilities, it is currently dependent on U.S. extended deterrence against potential Chinese threats. Canberra should also be concerned that China may be moving away from its no-first-use nuclear policy and may contemplate the use of tactical nuclear weapons to coerce the U.S. and its allies and deter them from intervening in a regional conflict. It is likely that Australia will be involved militarily in a Taiwan contingency if the U.S. chooses to intervene, but its contributions would vary according to whether conflict remains localized or widened. Either way, Australian territory would be used to support U.S. forces operating farther afield, putting Australian bases under threat from Chinese long-range missiles. Awkward questions on both sides of the alliance about the scope and reliability of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence can no longer be avoided.
KW - Australia-China relations
KW - China military modernisation
KW - Australia-US Relations
KW - Australian defence policy
KW - Extended Nuclear Deterrence
M3 - Chapter
T3 - NBR Special Report
SP - 15
EP - 28
BT - Meeting China's nuclear and WMD buildup
A2 - Gill, Bates
PB - The National Bureau of Asian Research
CY - Washington DC
ER -