Authentication codes and plaintext attack

R. Safavi-Naini*, L. Tombak, J. Pieprzyk

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference proceeding contributionpeer-review

Abstract

We study authentication codes (A-codes) and obtain lower bounds on the probability of success and number of encoding rules when enemy uses plaintext or chosen plaintext attack. A-codes with minimum number of encoding rules that provide perfect protection for impersonation and substitution in these attacks are characterized and a general method of constructing A-codes that provide perfect protection for these attacks, using A-codes that provide perfect protection in its traditional sense, are given. The constructions are optimal as they produce A-codes with minimum number of encoding rules if the original A-code has the same property.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationIEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, 1994
Place of PublicationPistacaway, NJ
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
Pages1-1
Number of pages1
ISBN (Print)0780320158
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1994
Externally publishedYes
EventProceedings of the 1994 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory - Trodheim, Norw
Duration: 27 Jun 19941 Jul 1994

Other

OtherProceedings of the 1994 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory
CityTrodheim, Norw
Period27/06/941/07/94

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