TY - JOUR
T1 - Automaticity and multiple memory systems
AU - Ashby, F. Gregory
AU - Crossley, Matthew J.
PY - 2012/5
Y1 - 2012/5
N2 - A large number of criteria have been proposed for determining when a behavior has become automatic. Almost all of these were developed before the widespread acceptance of multiple memory systems. Consequently, popular frameworks for studying automaticity often neglect qualitative differences in how different memory systems guide initial learning. Unfortunately, evidence suggests that automaticity criteria derived from these frameworks consistently misclassify certain sets of initial behaviors as automatic. Specifically, criteria derived from cognitive science mislabel much behavior still under the control of procedural memory as automatic, and criteria derived from animal learning mislabel some behaviors under the control of declarative memory as automatic. Even so, neither set of criteria make the opposite error-that is, both sets correctly identify any automatic behavior as automatic. In fact, evidence suggests that although there are multiple memory systems and therefore multiple routes to automaticity, there might nevertheless be only one common representation for automatic behaviors. A number of possible cognitive and cognitive neuroscience models of this single automaticity system are reviewed.
AB - A large number of criteria have been proposed for determining when a behavior has become automatic. Almost all of these were developed before the widespread acceptance of multiple memory systems. Consequently, popular frameworks for studying automaticity often neglect qualitative differences in how different memory systems guide initial learning. Unfortunately, evidence suggests that automaticity criteria derived from these frameworks consistently misclassify certain sets of initial behaviors as automatic. Specifically, criteria derived from cognitive science mislabel much behavior still under the control of procedural memory as automatic, and criteria derived from animal learning mislabel some behaviors under the control of declarative memory as automatic. Even so, neither set of criteria make the opposite error-that is, both sets correctly identify any automatic behavior as automatic. In fact, evidence suggests that although there are multiple memory systems and therefore multiple routes to automaticity, there might nevertheless be only one common representation for automatic behaviors. A number of possible cognitive and cognitive neuroscience models of this single automaticity system are reviewed.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84859875852&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1002/wcs.1172
DO - 10.1002/wcs.1172
M3 - Review article
C2 - 26301468
AN - SCOPUS:84859875852
SN - 1939-5078
VL - 3
SP - 363
EP - 376
JO - Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science
JF - Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science
IS - 3
ER -