Bad beliefs – a precis

Neil Levy

doi:10.1080/09515089.2022.2108390

Bad beliefs – a precis

Neil Levy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This brief paper sketches the main theses of my recent book Bad Beliefs. The book defends the view that human cognition is more evidence responsive than most psychologists and naturalistic philosophers think. In particular, we are responsive to the abundant higher-order evidence that we encounter in experiments and in everyday life.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	772-777
Number of pages	6
Journal	Philosophical Psychology
Volume	36
Issue number	4
Early online date	27 Aug 2022
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2022.2108390
Publication status	Published - 2023

Keywords

social epistemology
cultural evolution
evidence
rationality

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10.1080/09515089.2022.2108390

Cite this

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abstract = "This brief paper sketches the main theses of my recent book Bad Beliefs. The book defends the view that human cognition is more evidence responsive than most psychologists and naturalistic philosophers think. In particular, we are responsive to the abundant higher-order evidence that we encounter in experiments and in everyday life.",

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KW - social epistemology

KW - cultural evolution

KW - evidence

KW - rationality

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UR - http://purl.org/au-research/grants/arc/DP180102384

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Bad beliefs – a precis

Abstract

Keywords

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Changing philosophical perceptions of belief in a post-truth world

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Bad beliefs – a precis

Abstract

Keywords

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Projects

Changing philosophical perceptions of belief in a post-truth world

Cite this