Projects per year
Belief change and non-monotonic reasoning are arguably different perspectives on the same phenomenon, namely, jettisoning of currently held beliefs in response to some incompatible evidence. Investigations in this area typically assume, among other things, that the underlying (background) logic is compact, that is, whatever can be inferred from a set of sentences X can be inferred from a finite subset of X. Recent research in the field shows that this compactness assumption can be dispensed without inflicting much damage on the AGM paradigm of belief change. In this paper we investigate the impact of such relaxation on non-monotonic logics instead. In particular, we show that, when compactness is not guaranteed, while the bridge from the AGM paradigm of belief change to expectation logics remains unaffected, the “return trip” from expectation logics to AGM paradigm is no longer guaranteed. We finally explore the conditions under which such guarantee can be given.
|Title of host publication||Proceedings of the Thirty-Third AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence|
|Subtitle of host publication||AAAI 2019|
|Place of Publication||California, USA|
|Publisher||Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence|
|Number of pages||8|
|Publication status||Published - 23 Jul 2019|
|Event||Conference on Artificial Intelligence (33rd : 2019) - Hilton Hawaiian Village, Honolulu, United States|
Duration: 27 Jan 2019 → 1 Feb 2019
|Name||AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence|
|Conference||Conference on Artificial Intelligence (33rd : 2019)|
|Period||27/01/19 → 1/02/19|
FingerprintDive into the research topics of 'Belief change and non-monotonic reasoning sans compactness'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.
- 1 Active