Building trust-one gift at a time

Maroš Servátka; Steven Tucker; Radovan Vadovič

doi:10.3390/g2040412

Building trust-one gift at a time

Maroš Servátka^*, Steven Tucker, Radovan Vadovič

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

5 Citations (Scopus)

47 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

This paper reports an experiment evaluating the effect of gift giving on building trust. We have nested our explorations in the standard version of the investment game. Our gift treatment includes a dictator stage in which the trustee decides whether to give a gift to the trustor before both of them proceed to play the investment game. We observe that in such case the majority of trustees offer their endowment to trustors. Consequently, receiving a gift significantly increases the amounts sent by trustors when controlling for the differences in payoffs created by it. Trustees are, however, not better off by giving a gift as the increase in the amount sent by trustors is not large enough to offset the trustees' loss associated with the cost of giving a gift.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	412-433
Number of pages	22
Journal	Games
Volume	2
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.3390/g2040412
Publication status	Published - Dec 2011
Externally published	Yes

Bibliographical note

Version archived for private and non-commercial use with the permission of the author/s and according to publisher conditions. For further rights please contact the publisher.

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10.3390/g2040412

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title = "Building trust-one gift at a time",

abstract = "This paper reports an experiment evaluating the effect of gift giving on building trust. We have nested our explorations in the standard version of the investment game. Our gift treatment includes a dictator stage in which the trustee decides whether to give a gift to the trustor before both of them proceed to play the investment game. We observe that in such case the majority of trustees offer their endowment to trustors. Consequently, receiving a gift significantly increases the amounts sent by trustors when controlling for the differences in payoffs created by it. Trustees are, however, not better off by giving a gift as the increase in the amount sent by trustors is not large enough to offset the trustees' loss associated with the cost of giving a gift.",

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AU - Servátka, Maroš

AU - Tucker, Steven

AU - Vadovič, Radovan

N1 - Version archived for private and non-commercial use with the permission of the author/s and according to publisher conditions. For further rights please contact the publisher.

PY - 2011/12

Y1 - 2011/12

N2 - This paper reports an experiment evaluating the effect of gift giving on building trust. We have nested our explorations in the standard version of the investment game. Our gift treatment includes a dictator stage in which the trustee decides whether to give a gift to the trustor before both of them proceed to play the investment game. We observe that in such case the majority of trustees offer their endowment to trustors. Consequently, receiving a gift significantly increases the amounts sent by trustors when controlling for the differences in payoffs created by it. Trustees are, however, not better off by giving a gift as the increase in the amount sent by trustors is not large enough to offset the trustees' loss associated with the cost of giving a gift.

AB - This paper reports an experiment evaluating the effect of gift giving on building trust. We have nested our explorations in the standard version of the investment game. Our gift treatment includes a dictator stage in which the trustee decides whether to give a gift to the trustor before both of them proceed to play the investment game. We observe that in such case the majority of trustees offer their endowment to trustors. Consequently, receiving a gift significantly increases the amounts sent by trustors when controlling for the differences in payoffs created by it. Trustees are, however, not better off by giving a gift as the increase in the amount sent by trustors is not large enough to offset the trustees' loss associated with the cost of giving a gift.

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Building trust-one gift at a time

Abstract

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