Causal reasoning about human behavior genetics

synthesis and future directions

Kate E. Lynch*, James S. Morandini, Ilan Dar-Nimrod, Paul E. Griffiths

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

When explaining the causes of human behavior, genes are often given a special status. They are thought to relate to an intrinsic human ‘essence’, and essentialist biases have been shown to skew the way in which causation is assessed. Causal reasoning in general is subject to other pre-existing biases, including beliefs about normativity and morality. In this synthesis we show how factors which influence causal reasoning can be mapped to a framework of genetic essentialism, which reveals both the shared and unique factors underpinning biases in causal reasoning and genetic essentialism. This comparison identifies overlooked areas of research which could provide fruitful investigation, such as whether normative assessments of behaviors influence the way that genetic causes are ascribed or endorsed. We also outline the importance of distinguishing reasoning processes regarding genetic causal influences on one’s self versus others, as different cognitive processes and biases are likely to be at play.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)221–234
Number of pages14
JournalBehavior Genetics
Volume49
Issue number2
Early online date19 Jun 2018
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2019

    Fingerprint

Keywords

  • causation
  • genetic essentialism
  • psychological essentialism
  • bias
  • normativity
  • science communication

Cite this

Lynch, K. E., Morandini, J. S., Dar-Nimrod, I., & Griffiths, P. E. (2019). Causal reasoning about human behavior genetics: synthesis and future directions. Behavior Genetics, 49(2), 221–234. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10519-018-9909-z