Abstract
This paper provides a new explanation for investment-cash flow sensitivity from the perspective of CEO inside debt holdings. We examine the effect of CEO pensions and deferred compensation (inside debt) on investment-cash flow sensitivity for a sample of U.S. manufacturing firms from 2006 to 2012. We find that the firms with higher relative CEO leverage ratios (CEO's debt/equity ratio scaled by the firm's debt/equity ratio) generate higher investment-cash flow sensitivity. Moreover, one standard deviation increase in the logarithm of the relative CEO leverage ratio enlarges investment-cash flow sensitivity by 50 per cent. This positive relationship still holds even after we take account of endogeneity and financial constraints.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 423-443 |
| Number of pages | 21 |
| Journal | Accounting and Finance |
| Volume | 56 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Jun 2016 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- deferred compensation
- inside debt
- investment-cash flow sensitivity
- managerial risk aversion
- pension