CEO power and labor-friendly policy

Humyra Jabeen Bristy, Jianlei Han, Gary Gang Tian

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper explores the effect of the presence of powerful CEOs on the quality of their workplace and finds that firms with powerful CEOs invest less in labor-friendly programs and that this does not significantly affect firm value. However, the effect is attenuated for firms in some industries such as those that are highly competitive, those with a high level of innovation intensity, and those with high labor bargaining power. Policies emphasizing friendliness toward employees in highly competitive industries, in innovation-intensive industries, and in union-intensive industries are found to enhance firm value. Our study thus underscores the importance of industry heterogeneity in understanding the relationship between CEO power and labor-friendly policy.
Original languageEnglish
Article number101699
Pages (from-to)1-17
Number of pages17
JournalPacific-Basin Finance Journal
Volume71
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Feb 2022

Keywords

  • Powerful CEOs
  • Employee-friendly workplace
  • Competition
  • Innovation
  • Bargaining power of labor

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