Abstract
We present a model of bargaining between farmers and middlemen in which long-term risk considerations by farmers constrain their ability to engage in hard bargaining. In order to avoid the risk of middlemen exiting their region in the future due to hard bargaining, farmers settle for lower prices for their produce. The risks of prolonged drought-induced decline in produce quality and future oversupply of the perishable agricultural commodity also result in lower price outcomes under bargaining. If farmers join a collective that enhances their bargaining power, they tend to be better off when the group is homogeneous.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 386-405 |
| Number of pages | 20 |
| Journal | Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics |
| Volume | 42 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| Publication status | Published - Oct 2017 |
Keywords
- Agricultural produce marketing
- Asymmetric bargaining power
- Drought risks
- Farm gate price
- Horticultural price bargaining
- Market information systems
- Middlemen in agriculture