Cognitive ability and the extended cognition thesis

Duncan Pritchard*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

157 Citations (Scopus)


This paper explores the ramifications of the extended cognition thesis in the philosophy of mind for contemporary epistemology. In particular, it argues that all theories of knowledge need to accommodate the ability intuition that knowledge involves cognitive ability, but that once this requirement is understood correctly there is no reason why one could not have a conception of cognitive ability that was consistent with the extended cognition thesis. There is thus, surprisingly, a straightforward way of developing our current thinking about knowledge such that it incorporates the extended cognition thesis.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)133-151
Number of pages19
Issue numberSUPPL. 1
Publication statusPublished - 2010
Externally publishedYes


  • Cognition
  • Cognitive ability
  • Epistemic luck
  • Epistemic virtue
  • Epistemology
  • Extended cognition
  • Knowledge


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