Cognitive integration, enculturated cognition and the socially extended mind

Richard Menary*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

25 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Shaun Gallagher presents an interesting case for the social extension of mind. I argue that there is one way in which Gallagher can argue for social extension, which is continuous with an enculturated model of cognition, such as cognitive integration. This way requires us to think of the mind as extended by social/cultural practices that are specifically targeted at cognitive tasks. The other way in which Gallagher argues for social extension is that social institutions - such as museums or the law - are literal constituents of our minds. This second way involves a number of problems and objections and is inconsistent with an enculturated or practice based approach. I conclude by urging Gallagher to endorse the first way.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)26-34
Number of pages9
JournalCognitive Systems Research
Volume25-26
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Dec 2013

Keywords

  • extended mind
  • cognitive integration
  • enculturation

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