Intenzionalità collettiva e struttura ontologica del diritto

Translated title of the contribution: Collective intentionality and the ontological structure of law

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

In Facts, reasons and joint action: thoughts on the social ontology of law, and Is Law Grounded in Joint Action?, Richard Ekins and Damiano Canale, respectively, raise several objections against the views that I defended in my article Austin, Hart and Shapiro: Three Variations of Law as an Entity Grounded in a Social Practice. Ekins and Canale make thought-provoking suggestions and express sharp criticisms concerning my reading of Austin, Hart and Shapiro, and my understanding of the relationship between collective intentionality, on the one hand, and the ontological structure of the law, on the other. The main purpose of this article is to respond to the most relevant objections they raise against my views.
Original languageItalian
Pages (from-to)133-148
Number of pages16
JournalDiritto e questioni pubbliche
Volume16
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 2016

Bibliographical note

Originally published in Rechtstheorie 45(3), 2014, pp. 335-353. doi: 10.3790/rth.45.3.335

Keywords

  • collective intentionality
  • We-Intentions
  • law as a social practice
  • ontological structure of law

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Collective intentionality and the ontological structure of law'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

  • Cite this