Abstract
Some connectionists (e.g. Smolensky, 1988) argue that classical AI models offer at best a good approximation to the fine-grained pychological truths revealed by connectionism. Likewise, some conventional AI theorists suggest that connectionism at best displays a new way of implementing the insight embodied in classical models. But the terms of the debate, I suggest, are by no means as cut and dried as such polarizations suggest. Instead, the mind may require explanation in terms of a multiplicity of virtual architectures. Both different tasks, and different aspects of that same tasks, may call for computational explanations quantifying over the operations and data-structures of different virtual machines.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 49-65 |
Number of pages | 17 |
Journal | Artificial Intelligence Review |
Volume | 3 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Mar 1989 |
Externally published | Yes |