Abstract
Most philosophers think that phenomenal consciousness underlies, or at any rate makes a large contribution, to moral considerability. This paper argues that many such accounts invoke question-begging arguments. Moreover, they’re unable to explain apparent differences in moral status across and within different species. In the light of these problems, I argue that we ought to take very seriously a view according to which moral considerability is grounded in functional properties. Phenomenal consciousness may be sufficient for having a moral value, but it may not be necessary, and it may contribute relatively little to our overall considerability.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | 21 |
| Pages (from-to) | 1-14 |
| Number of pages | 14 |
| Journal | Neuroethics |
| Volume | 17 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Jul 2024 |
Bibliographical note
Copyright the Author(s) 2024. Version archived for private and non-commercial use with the permission of the author/s and according to publisher conditions. For further rights please contact the publisher.Keywords
- phenomenal consciousness
- access consciousness
- prudential value
- moral value
- non-human animals