Consciousness, free will, and moral responsibility

Gregg D. Caruso*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

In recent decades, with advances in the behavioral, cognitive, and neurosciences, the idea that patterns of human behavior may ultimately be due to factors beyond our conscious control has increasingly gained traction and renewed interest in the age-old problem of free will. To properly assess what, if anything, these empirical advances can tell us about free will and moral responsibility, we first need to get clear on the following questions: Is consciousness necessary for free will? If so, what role or function must it play? For example, are agents morally responsible for actions and behaviors that are carried out automatically or without conscious control or guidance? Are they morally responsible for actions, judgments, and attitudes that are the result of implicit biases or situational features of their surroundings of which they are unaware? Clarifying the relationship between consciousness and free will is imperative if we want to evaluate the various arguments for and against free will.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationThe Routledge handbook of consciousness
EditorsRocco J. Gennaro
Place of PublicationNew York ; London
PublisherRoutledge, Taylor and Francis Group
Chapter6
Pages78-91
Number of pages14
ISBN (Electronic)9781317386810, 9781315676982
ISBN (Print)9781138936218
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2018
Externally publishedYes

Publication series

NameRoutledge Handbooks in Philosophy
PublisherRoutledge

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