Prescindamos del poder constituyente en la creación constitucional: los límites conceptuales del poder para reemplazar o reformar una constitución

Translated title of the contribution: Constitution-making (without) constituent power: on the conceptual boundaries of the power to replace or amend the Constitution

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Abstract

This article makes a case against the wide-spread conception of the constitution-making power as constituent power. A conceptual analysis of the power to replace or revise the constitution shows that this understanding is incorrect. Instead, the article advances a socio-ontological conception of the power to replace or revise a written constitution, as a limited deontic power of citizens’ political proxy-agents, who are collectively intentionally recognized as having the status of constitution-makers for performing the function of institutionalizing constitutionalism. This conception illuminates a clearer approach to understand the constitution-making power, and to evaluate the legitimacy of its exercises.
Translated title of the contributionConstitution-making (without) constituent power: on the conceptual boundaries of the power to replace or amend the Constitution
Original languageSpanish
Pages (from-to)59-99
Number of pages41
JournalAnuario Iberoamericano de Justicia Constitucional
Volume22
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2018
Externally publishedYes

Bibliographical note

Copyright the Author(s) 2018. Version archived for private and non-commercial use with the permission of the author/s and according to publisher conditions. For further rights please contact the publisher.

Keywords

  • constitution-making
  • constituent power
  • constitutional change
  • constitutional replacement
  • constitutional revision
  • constitutional amendment

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