Contrastivism, evidence, and scepticism

Duncan Pritchard*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

8 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

I offer a critical treatment of the contrastivist response to the problem of radical scepticism. In particular, I argue that if contrastivism is understood along externalist lines then it is unnecessary, while if it is understood along internalist lines then it is intellectually dissatisfying. Moreover, I claim that a closer examination of the conditions under which it is appropriate to claim knowledge reveals that we can accommodate many of the intuitions appealed to by contrastivists without having to opt for this particular brand of epistemological revisionism.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)305-323
Number of pages19
JournalSocial Epistemology
Volume22
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2008
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Contrastivism
  • Epistemology
  • Evidence
  • Externalism/Internalism
  • Scepticism

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