Corporate visibility and executive pay

Bruce A. Rayton*, Stephen Brammer, Suwina Cheng

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)


This paper seeks evidence of implicit regulation of executive pay. The implicit regulation hypothesis suggests highly visible companies will constrain their behavior to avoid potential reprisals from constituents, politicians and potential regulators. We extend this literature using a measure of corporate visibility based on the number of news stories about each firm in a balanced panel of 242 public companies.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)337-339
Number of pages3
JournalEconomics Letters
Issue number1
Early online date4 Jun 2012
Publication statusPublished - Oct 2012


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