Correlated secrets in quantitative information flow

Nicolás E. Bordenabe, Geoffrey Smith

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference proceeding contributionpeer-review

9 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

A fundamental challenge in controlling the leakage of sensitive information by computer systems is the possibility of correlations between different secrets, with the result that leaking information about one secret may also leak information about a different secret. We explore such leakage, here called Dalenius leakage, within the context of the g-leakage family of leakage measures. We prove a fundamental equivalence between Dalenius min-entropy leakage under arbitrary correlations and g-leakage under arbitrary gain functions, and show how this equivalence increases the significance of the composition refinement relation. We also consider Dalenius leakage in the case when the marginal distributions induced by the correlation are known, giving techniques to compute stronger upper bounds in this case.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationCSF 2016
Subtitle of host publicationIEEE 29th Computer Security Foundations Symposium : proceedings
Place of PublicationPiscataway, NJ
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
Pages93-104
Number of pages12
ISBN (Print)9781509026074
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2016
EventIEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium (29th : 2016) - Lisbon, Portugal
Duration: 27 Jun 20161 Jul 2016

Conference

ConferenceIEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium (29th : 2016)
CityLisbon, Portugal
Period27/06/161/07/16

Keywords

  • Information leakage
  • Dalenius’s Desideratum
  • channel capacity

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