TY - JOUR
T1 - Creation of backdoors in quantum communications via laser damage
AU - Makarov, Vadim
AU - Bourgoin, Jean Philippe
AU - Chaiwongkhot, Poompong
AU - Gagné, Mathieu
AU - Jennewein, Thomas
AU - Kaiser, Sarah
AU - Kashyap, Raman
AU - Legré, Matthieu
AU - Minshull, Carter
AU - Sajeed, Shihan
PY - 2016/9/15
Y1 - 2016/9/15
N2 - Practical quantum communication (QC) protocols are assumed to be secure provided implemented devices are properly characterized and all known side channels are closed. We show that this is not always true. We demonstrate a laser-damage attack capable of modifying device behavior on demand. We test it on two practical QC systems for key distribution and coin tossing, and show that newly created deviations lead to side channels. This reveals that laser damage is a potential security risk to existing QC systems, and necessitates their testing to guarantee security.
AB - Practical quantum communication (QC) protocols are assumed to be secure provided implemented devices are properly characterized and all known side channels are closed. We show that this is not always true. We demonstrate a laser-damage attack capable of modifying device behavior on demand. We test it on two practical QC systems for key distribution and coin tossing, and show that newly created deviations lead to side channels. This reveals that laser damage is a potential security risk to existing QC systems, and necessitates their testing to guarantee security.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84989235769&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1103/PhysRevA.94.030302
DO - 10.1103/PhysRevA.94.030302
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84989235769
SN - 1050-2947
VL - 94
SP - 1
EP - 6
JO - Physical Review A - Atomic, Molecular, and Optical Physics
JF - Physical Review A - Atomic, Molecular, and Optical Physics
IS - 3
M1 - 030302
ER -