By working with activists on the ground in Russia, we obtained five leaked blocklists signed by Roskomnadzor, the Russian government’s federal service for mass communications, alongwith seven years of historical blocklist data. This authoritative list contains domains, IPs, and subnets that ISPs have been required to block since November 1st, 2012. We used the blocklist from April 24 2019, that contains 132,798 domains, 324,695 IPs, and 39subnets, to collect active measurement data from residential, datacenter and infrastructural vantage points. Our vantage pointsspan 361 unique ASes that control≈65% of Russian IP address space.
Our findings suggest that data centers block differently from the residential ISPs both in quantity and in method of blocking,resulting in different experiences of the Internet for residential network perspectives and data center perspectives. As expected,residential vantage points experience high levels of censorship.While we observe a range of blocking techniques, such as TCP/IP blocking, DNS manipulation, or keyword based filtering, we find that residential ISPs are more likely inject blockpages with explicit notices to users when censorship is enforced. Russia’s censorship architecture is a blueprint, and perhaps a forewarning of what and how national censorship policies could be implemented in many other countries that have similarly diverse ISP ecosystems to Russia’s. Understanding decentralized control will be key to continuing to preserve Internet freedom for years to come.
|Title of host publication||Proceedings, 2020 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium|
|Place of Publication||Reston, VA|
|Number of pages||18|
|Publication status||Published - 2020|
|Event||Network and Distributed Systems Security Symposium 2020 - https://www.ndss-symposium.org/ndss2020, San Diego, United States|
Duration: 23 Feb 2020 → 26 Feb 2020
|Conference||Network and Distributed Systems Security Symposium 2020|
|Abbreviated title||NDSS 2020|
|Period||23/02/20 → 26/02/20|