Defending the Free-Will Intuitions Scale: reply to Stephen Morris

Oisin Deery; Taylor Davis; Jasmine Carey

doi:10.1080/09515089.2014.946989

Defending the Free-Will Intuitions Scale: reply to Stephen Morris

Oisin Deery^*, Taylor Davis, Jasmine Carey

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In our paper, “The Free-Will Intuitions Scale and the question of natural compatibilism” (this issue), we seek to advance empirical debates about free will by measuring the relevant folk intuitions using the scale methodology of psychology, as a supplement to standard experimental methods. Stephen Morris (this issue) raises a number of concerns about our paper. Here, we respond to Morris's concerns.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	808–814
Number of pages	7
Journal	Philosophical Psychology
Volume	28
Issue number	6
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2014.946989
Publication status	Published - 18 Aug 2015
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Compatibilism
Experimental Philosophy
Free Will, Intuitions
Free Will
Intuitions

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10.1080/09515089.2014.946989

Cite this

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Defending the Free-Will Intuitions Scale: reply to Stephen Morris

Abstract

Keywords

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