Defending the use of the mutual manipulability criterion in the extended cognition debate

Alexander James Gillett; Christopher Jack Whyte; Christopher Louis Hewitson; David Michael Kaplan

doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2022.1043747

Defending the use of the mutual manipulability criterion in the extended cognition debate

Alexander James Gillett^*, Christopher Jack Whyte, Christopher Louis Hewitson, David Michael Kaplan

^*Corresponding author for this work

School of Psychological Sciences

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)

86 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

Kaplan (2012) introduced the mutual manipulability (MM) criterion into the extended cognition debate as a promising way of demarcating the bounds of cognition. A number of critiques have been raised against this proposal, but perhaps the most serious is Baumgartner and Wilutzky’s (2017) contention that MM is fundamentally incoherent and undermines the entire debate. In this reply, we focus our response on this specific challenge by drawing on a recently modified version of the criterion (Craver et al., 2021). We show that the core idea underpinning mutual manipulability remains a coherent and legitimate way of demarcating the boundaries of cognition.

Original language	English
Article number	1043747
Pages (from-to)	1-9
Number of pages	9
Journal	Frontiers in Psychology
Volume	13
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2022.1043747
Publication status	Published - 18 Nov 2022

Bibliographical note

Copyright the Author(s) 2022. Version archived for private and non-commercial use with the permission of the author/s and according to publisher conditions. For further rights please contact the publisher.

Keywords

mutual manipulability
embodied cognition
intervention
mechanism
extended cognition

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10.3389/fpsyg.2022.1043747

Publisher version (open access)Final published version, 454 KBLicence: CC BY

Cite this

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abstract = "Kaplan (2012) introduced the mutual manipulability (MM) criterion into the extended cognition debate as a promising way of demarcating the bounds of cognition. A number of critiques have been raised against this proposal, but perhaps the most serious is Baumgartner and Wilutzky{\textquoteright}s (2017) contention that MM is fundamentally incoherent and undermines the entire debate. In this reply, we focus our response on this specific challenge by drawing on a recently modified version of the criterion (Craver et al., 2021). We show that the core idea underpinning mutual manipulability remains a coherent and legitimate way of demarcating the boundaries of cognition.",

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Defending the use of the mutual manipulability criterion in the extended cognition debate

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Keywords

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