Defusing epistemic relativism

Duncan Pritchard*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

29 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper explores the question of whether there is an interesting form of specifically epistemic relativism available, a position which can lend support to claims of a broadly relativistic nature but which is not committed to relativism about truth. It is argued that the most plausible rendering of such a view turns out not to be the radical thesis that it is often represented as being.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)397-412
Number of pages16
JournalSynthese
Volume166
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2009
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Disagreement
  • Epistemology
  • Relativism

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