Defusing epistemic relativism

Duncan Pritchard

doi:10.1007/s11229-007-9278-2

Defusing epistemic relativism

Duncan Pritchard^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

55 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper explores the question of whether there is an interesting form of specifically epistemic relativism available, a position which can lend support to claims of a broadly relativistic nature but which is not committed to relativism about truth. It is argued that the most plausible rendering of such a view turns out not to be the radical thesis that it is often represented as being.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	397-412
Number of pages	16
Journal	Synthese
Volume	166
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9278-2
Publication status	Published - Jan 2009
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Disagreement
Epistemology
Relativism

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10.1007/s11229-007-9278-2

Cite this

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KW - Disagreement

KW - Epistemology

KW - Relativism

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Defusing epistemic relativism

Abstract

Keywords

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