Delusions, harmful dysfunctions, and treatable conditions

Peter Clutton*, Stephen Gadsby

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    5 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    It has recently been suggested that delusions be conceived of as symptoms on the harmful dysfunction account of disorder: delusions sometimes arise from dysfunction, but can also arise through normal cognition. Much attention has thus been payed to the question of how we can determine whether a delusion arises from dysfunction as opposed to normal cognition. In this paper, we consider another question, one that remains under-explored: which delusions warrant treatment? On the harmful dysfunction account, this question dissociates from the question about dysfunction—there are a broad range of “treatable conditions” beyond mere harmful dysfunctions. As such, many conditions that arise from normal cognition are also eligible for medical intervention. We argue that some delusions that arise from normal cognition may well fall under the banner of treatable conditions. We examine the practical and ethical questions surrounding such treatment, including the issue of coercive and deceptive treatment options.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)167-181
    Number of pages15
    JournalNeuroethics
    Volume11
    Issue number2
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - Jul 2018

    Keywords

    • Delusion
    • Disorder
    • Dysfunction
    • Symptom
    • Treatment

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