Deterrence effects of expanding sanctions of discolsure regulation

evidence from analysts' information environment

Ka Wai (Stanley) Choi

Research output: Contribution to journalMeeting abstract


Disclosure regulations largely depend on deterrence. Recent years have seen many expansions in corporate disclosure regulations in developed markets. Many involved adding/expanding sanctions. While theories such as economics of crime and strategic regulation support that expanding sanctions generates additional deterrence, the effects may be undermined by the fact that budget-constrained regulators generally can only afford low detection and enforcement activities. Furthermore, firms incur costs complying with these laws. This paper examines empirically whether adding sanctions generates incremental deterrence effects.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)21-22
Number of pages2
JournalExpo 2012 Higher Degree Research : book of abstracts
Publication statusPublished - 2012
Externally publishedYes
EventHigher Degree Research Expo (8th : 2012) - Sydney
Duration: 12 Nov 201213 Nov 2012


  • Deterrence
  • Sanctions
  • Information Environment
  • Analyst Forecast

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