Do we, through perception and memory have direct contact with the world, or is such contact only mediated through mental representations? This is a central issue in the philosophy of psychology with the majority taking the representational view. Process philosophy, with its emphasis on a relational view of time, sides with a minority view - that of direct realism. In this paper I examine two schools of thought within the direct realist tradition - experimental psychology and process metaphysics. In particular I compare and contrast the work of what could be called the Australian realist school in psychology, with that of the prominent process philosopher, Charles Hartsborne.
|Title of host publication||Searching for new contrasts|
|Subtitle of host publication||Whiteheadian contributions to contemporary challenges in neurophysiology, psychology, psychotherapy, and the philosophy of mind|
|Editors||Franz G. Riffert, Michel Weber|
|Place of Publication||Frankfurt am Main, Germany|
|Number of pages||18|
|Publication status||Published - 2003|