Disagreement, intellectual humility and reflection

Duncan Pritchard*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

Abstract

It is often suggested that responding to a disagreement with one’s epistemic peer with anything less than conciliation (i.e., a downgrading of one’s conviction in the contested proposition) is incompatible with the demands of intellectual humility. I argue that this is mistaken, and that on the most plausible conception of intellectual humility it can be entirely reasonable to stick to one’s original judgement. What is required by intellectual humility, I claim, is further reflection on one’s epistemic position with regard to the target proposition. Crucially, however, such reflection is not to be understood as being incompatible with continued conviction in the target proposition.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationThinking about oneself
Subtitle of host publicationthe place and value of reflection in philosophy and psychology
EditorsWaldomiro J. Silva-Filho, Luca Tateo
Place of PublicationCham, Switzerland
PublisherSpringer, Springer Nature
Pages59-71
Number of pages13
ISBN (Electronic)9783030182663
ISBN (Print)9783030182656
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2019
Externally publishedYes

Publication series

NamePhilosophical Studies Series
Volume141
ISSN (Print)0921-8599
ISSN (Electronic)2542-8349

Keywords

  • Disagreement
  • Dogmatism
  • Epistemology
  • Intellectual humility
  • Reflection

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